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THE FALLACY OF CONTRACT IN SEXUAL 
SLAVERY: A RESPONSE TO RAMSEYER’S 
“CONTRACTING FOR SEX IN THE PACIFIC 
WAR”
Yong-Shik Lee,* Natsu Taylor Saito,** Jonathan Todres***
I.  Introduction
Over seven decades have passed since the Second World War but, de-
spite the passage of time, the trauma from the most destructive war in histo-
ry remains and controversies over the extent and even the existence of some 
of the cruelest war crimes, such as sexual slavery enforced by Japan, con-
tinue with attempts to rewrite history and to exonerate those who engaged in 
war crimes. The latest such attempt is a troubling recharacterization of the 
Japanese war crime of sexual slavery as a legitimate contractual arrange-
ment. A recent paper authored by J. Mark Ramseyer (hereinafter “the au-
thor”), entitled Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, mischaracterizes 
sexual slavery as a contractual process by which the victims freely partici-
pated in prostitution in return for a substantial reward, denying the responsi-
bility of the Japanese government and its military for the atrocious human 
rights violations committed.
1
Ramseyer’s article is flawed and lacks factual foundation. Its primary 
point is that the Japanese government or military was not responsible for the 
recruitment or management of “comfort women”
2
but rather that private 
* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law and Director 
and Professorial Fellow, The Law and Development Institute. I am grateful to distinguished 
colleagues, including Professors Noah Feldman (Harvard Law School), Alexis Dudden (Uni-
versity of Connecticut), Frank Upham (New York University School of Law), and Albert 
Choi (University of Michigan Law School), for insightful comments and advice. I am also 
thankful to research assistants, including Andrew Smith, Kelly McGrath, and Thomas Oliver 
Flint, J.D. candidates at Georgia State University College of Law, for research and editorial 
assistance.
** Distinguished University Professor & Professor of Law, Georgia State University 
College of Law.
*** Distinguished University Professor & Professor of Law, Georgia State University 
College of Law. We would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to the editors of the 
Michigan Journal of International Law, who not only provided excellent editorial assistance 
but also brought our article to print on an expedited timeframe.
1. J. Mark Ramseyer, Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, 65 INT’L REV L. &
ECON. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105971
[https://perma.cc/D78P-UG8W].
2. The term “comfort women” was “a euphemism for women who provided sexual 
services to Japanese Imperial Army troops during Japan’s militaristic period that ended with 
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parties made the arrangements through voluntary contracts with the recruits 
or their parents. As such, the author claims, problems with the recruitment 
or treatment, if any, should be attributed to cheating brothel owners, which 
the author contends occur in any industry, or dishonest Korean recruiters 
who deployed deceitful recruitment tactics. 
3
The author adds:
Note, however, what this problem was not. It was not that the gov-
ernment, either the Korean or the Japanese government, forced 
women into prostitution. It was not that the Japanese army worked 
with fraudulent recruiters. It was not even that recruiters focused on 
the army’s comfort stations. Instead, the problem involved domes-
tic Korean recruiters who had been tricking young women into 
working at brothels for decades.
4
This is flatly untrue; an abundance of evidence, including numerous tes-







affirms that the victims were coerced, deceived, or otherwise 
World War II and who generally lived under conditions of sexual slavery.” Ami Lynch, Com-
fort Women, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/comfort-women (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2021). 
3. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Id. at 5.
5. See, e.g., GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S BRUTAL REGIME OF 
ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995); YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI,
COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II
(Suzanne O’Brien trans., 2000); YUKI TANAKA, JAPAN’S COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL 
SLAVERY AND PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE US OCCUPATION (2002); C.
SARAH SOH, THE COMFORT WOMEN (2008); CAROLINE NORMA, THE JAPANESE COMFORT 
WOMEN AND SEXUAL SLAVERY DURING THE CHINA AND PACIFIC WARS (2016).
6. Ustinia Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape, Int’l Comm. Jurists, Comfort Women: An 
Unfinished Ordeal (1994) [hereinafter “ICJ Report”]; Amnesty Int’l, Still Waiting After 60 
Years, Justice for Survivors of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery System, Al Index ASA 22/012
/2005 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter “Amnesty International Report”].
7. Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences), Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime,
4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter “Coomaraswamy Report”]; 
Gay J. McDougall (Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Systemic Rape and Sexual Slavery 
Practices), Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like 
Practices during Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter “McDougall Report”]. There have been critiques about selected portions of the Coomar-
aswamy Report. See, e.g., Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Comfort Women: Beyond Litigious 
Feminism, 58 MONUMENTA NIPPONCIA, 222, 232 (2003) (discussing the controversy around 
the story of Seiji Yoshida which was retracted). The Coomaraswamy Report also introduces 
critiques of the Yoshida story, such as one provided by a Japanese scholar (Dr. Ikuhiko Hata).
Coomaraswamy Report, at 7. The Coomaraswamy Report is broadly accepted and cited by 
other studies, such as the 2005 Amnesty International Report. A prior report by the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva, Switzerland, also corroborates the account of 
the Coomaraswamy Report. ICJ Report, supra note 6. The U.S. Congress also supported the 
U.N. Report by urging the Japanese government to follow the recommendations of the United 
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manipulated into sexual servitude under the direct or indirect involvement 
of the Japanese government or the military.
8
The Japanese government con-
ducted its own study and issued a statement (“Kono Statement”) through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, acknowledging the following:
The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in 
the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the 
transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women 
was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response 
to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed 
that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, 
through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative
/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They 
lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere 
[emphasis added].
9
The Ramseyer article never mentions the Kono statement. The Japanese 
government also established strict regulations for the so-called “comfort sta-
tions” (perhaps more appropriately, hereinafter referred to as “forced sex 
stations”) which, according to the report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (“the Coomaras-
wamy Report”), “reveal beyond doubt the extent to which the Japanese 
Nations and Amnesty International with respect to comfort women. H.R. 121, 110th Cong. 
(2007).
8. The Coomaraswamy Report acknowledges that women and girls who were already 
sex workers were also recruited. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5.
9. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on 
the Issue of “Comfort Women,” MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFS. JAPAN (Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter 
“Kono Statement”], https://web.archive.org/web/20140709022903/http://www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (archived English translation of 
the statement). Prior to the Kono Statement, the Japanese government had issued a statement 
in August 1992 that admitted, for the first time, deception, coercion and official involvement 
in the recruitment of comfort women. HICKS, supra note 5, at 238. Coercion and deception in 
the recruitment of so-called comfort women by the Japanese government and military is a 
well-established historical fact. See supra note 5 (listing academic works affirming the fact). 
Reflecting this consensus, in 2016, fifteen associations of history scholars and educators in 
Japan issued a joint statement and clarified in relevant part, “Historical research has unequiv-
ocally established that the Japanese government and army proposed, established, managed, 
and regulated “comfort stations” at military facilities, and that the “comfort women” system 
was essentially a system of sexual slavery that violated existing domestic and international 
legal standards.” Hist. Sci. Soc’y Japan, A Joint Statement by Japanese Historians and Histo-
ry Educators on the “Comfort Women” Issue, J. HIST. STUD. (May 30, 2016), http://rekiken.jp
/english/appeals/appeal_20160530.html [https://perma.cc/88PQ-H586]. A year before, in 
2015, twenty U.S.-based history professors had also issued a statement and publicly objected 
to the attempts by the Japanese government to suppress statements in history textbooks both 
in Japan and elsewhere about “comfort women” which these scholars referred to as “a brutal 
system of sexual exploitation in the service of the Japanese imperial army during World War 
II.” Alexis Dudden, Letter to the Editor, Standing with Historians of Japan, PERSP.
ON HISTORY (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories
/perspectives-on-history/march-2015/letter-to-the-editor-standing-with-historians-of-japan.
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forces took direct responsibility for the comfort stations and were intimately 
connected with all aspects of their organization, but they also clearly indi-
cate how legitimized and established an institution the stations had be-
come.”
10
The author never discusses any of this evidence or any other materials 
weighing against his argument.
11
As the Japanese government admitted in 
the Kono Statement,
12
sexual servitude was not the outcome of voluntary 
transactions under a private contractual process, but rather it proceeded un-
der the direct or indirect involvement of the Japanese military in the re-
cruitment and management of the victims who were kept under horrendous 
conditions that included the deprivation of their freedom, dignity, health, 
and life as human beings.
13
For all or most of the victims, there was never a 
legitimate contract but only coercion, deceit, and torture
14
– hence justifying 
the use of term “sexual slavery”
15
– and there were no contractual dynamics 
for the forced or deceived victims, notwithstanding the contentions of the 
author.
16
Reports commissioned by the United Nations,
17
investigative reports of 
the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International,
18
and a 
10. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4.
11. For another significant example, in 1998 the Shimonoseki Branch of the Yamagu-
chi District Court ruled that the comfort women system was outright discrimination based up-
on gender and ethnicity and that the system violated fundamental human rights guaranteed by 
Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution. Chin Kim & Stanley S. Kim, Delayed Justice: The 
Case of the Japanese Imperial Military Sex Slaves, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 263–64 
(1998). This ruling is significant because the Japanese court affirmed the illegal nature of 
military sexual slavery. The court’s compensation order, but not the cited finding of the court, 
was reversed by the higher courts on appeal.
12. Kono Statement, supra note 9.
13. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 48–50; Amnesty 
International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13; Christine Chinkin, Women’s International Tri-
bunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 335, 337 (2001).
14. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; ICJ Report, supra note 6; McDougall Re-
port, supra note 7.
15. See also Carmen M. Argibay, Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 386–87 (2003) (discussing why the Japanese “comfort system”
was a form of sexual slavery).
16. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1. A group of scholars have issued a joint statement and 
pointed out that “Ramseyer produces no evidence of any signed contracts for work at ‘comfort 
stations.’” Amy Stanley, Hannah Shepherd, Sayaka Chatani, David Ambaras, & Chelsea 
Szendi Schieder, “Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War”: The Case for Retraction on 
Grounds of Academic Misconduct, ASIA-PACIFIC J., (Feb. 18, 2021), https://sites.google.com
/view/concernedhistorians (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). In addition, two Harvard history pro-
fessors, Carter Eckert and Andrew Gordon, have also concluded that Ramseyer fails to cite 
any evidence for contracts that he claims existed. Ki-weon Cho, Harvard History Professors 
Condemn Ramseyer’s Paper for Lacking “Scholarly Integrity,” HANKYOREH (Feb. 19, 2021),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/983742.html.
17. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; McDougall Report, supra note 7.
18. ICJ Report, supra note 6; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6.
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number of academic works offer detailed accounts of the sexual slavery at 
issue.
19
These reports and studies draw on numerous sources including tes-
timonials of survivors and ex-soldiers,
20
accounts of various scholars, doc-
umentary evidence, and positions of the governments of South and North 
Korea as well as Japan.
21
Given the evidence, we believe that the author’s 
attempt to apply the concept of a contract to justify inhumane and life-
threatening sexual slavery (many of the victims lost their lives
22
) is grossly 
misplaced. A contract analysis has no place, not only in cases of sexual 
slavery but also in many instances of prewar recruitment of prostitutes 
where young girls were sent to brothels without having any chance to make 
the free, informed decision that constitutes a core element of contract for-
mation.
23
There is no legitimate contract where a party is coerced, deceived, 
or otherwise manipulated into sexual servitude.
With this understanding, this article discusses the critical flaws in the 
arguments advanced by Ramseyer, the traumatic impact of such arguments 
on survivors of these war crimes and many others who share their pain, and 
19. See supra note 6.
20. The Coomaraswamy Report acknowledges that “[n]early all evidence concerning 
the recruitment of ‘comfort women’ comes from the oral testimony of the victims them-
selves.” Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. The Report also observes that the absence 
of official documents concerning the actual recruitment process “made it easy for many to 
reject the testimonies of the victims as anecdotal or even created to implicate the Government 
in a matter which was essentially a private and, therefore, a privately run, system of prostitu-
tion.” Id. at 4. However, the consistency of the accounts of women from different parts of 
Asia of the manner in which they were recruited and the clear involvement of the military and 
government at different levels is indisputable. Id. In 2017, documentary evidence, which 
demonstrates the direct involvement of the Japanese military in the recruitment, was reported: 
A 1938 Japanese police report recorded the “kidnapping” of women to be sent to “comfort 
stations” in Shanghai, China. 1 GOV’T JAPAN, COMPILATION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALS ON 
MILITARY COMFORT WOMEN 27 (March 24, 1997), cited in Seon Yoon Hwang, Japanese 
Imperial Police Report Expresses the Recruitment of Comfort Women as Kidnapping,
JOONGANG NEWSPAPER (Aug. 13, 2017), https://news.joins.com/article/21839947.
21. Japan’s demands that the United Nations amend the Report in 2014 were rejected. 
Ankit Panda, Japan Denied Revision of UN Comfort Women Report, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 7, 
2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-denied-revision-of-un-comfort-women-report/.
22. Many victims of sexual slavery were killed by the retreating Japanese troops. In 
Micronesia, for example, the Japanese army killed seventy of them in one night, because they 
felt the women would be an encumbrance or an embarrassment were they to be captured by 
the advancing American troops. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. In another shame-
ful episode during the last phase of the war, a Japanese military officer had a sergeant throw 
two hand-grenades into a dugout late at night, while comfort women slept, fearing that they 
might not commit suicide before capture by the Allied forces. HICKS, supra note 5, at 135; see 
also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 15. According to one estimate, ninety percent of “comfort 
women” did not survive the war. Erin Blakemore, The Brutal History of Japan’s Comfort 
Women, HISTORY (updated Jul. 21, 2019, original Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.history.com
/news/comfort-women-japan-military-brothels-korea [https://perma.cc/W23J-4BJU].
23. For a discussion of contract formation, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
3–41 (4th ed. 2004). In many jurisdictions, including Japan, one may not bind minors under a 
contract, and a contract is voidable at the election of the minor. Id. at 222. 
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the broader implications of these and other similar justifications for sexual 
exploitation. Ultimately, we argue that the author’s contractual approach is 
both misplaced in circumstances in which one party cannot freely decide 
their actions, as was the case here, and deeply inappropriate as applied to 
gross human rights violations such as sexual slavery.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the irrelevance of pre-
war prostitution and refutes the attempt to justify wartime sexual slavery as 
a continuation of a legitimate sex industry. Part III examines the brutality of 
the forced sex stations. The Ramseyer article describes these stations, locat-
ed throughout the Japanese frontlines, as agreeable places for business 
where willing sex workers earned high-level income.
24
On the contrary, the 
conditions of these stations were brutal and miserable, as aptly observed by 
the Kono Statement and many other reports and studies; mistreatment, rape, 
other forms of torture, and even killings routinely took place.
25
Part IV dis-
cusses the fallacy of the contract arguments advanced by the author where a 
legitimate contract could not have been made due to coercion, deception, 
and the prohibitively high cost of compensating for the extreme dangers on 
the frontlines of the intensifying war. Part V considers the broader human 
rights implications of the exploitation of “comfort women” and discusses 
the more recent response of the Japanese government. Finally, in Part VI, 
the article concludes by addressing the importance of correcting these inac-
curacies, both to reaffirm the dignity of survivors of sexual servitude and to 
ensure broader accountability for human rights violations.
II.  Irrelevance of “Prewar Prostitution”
A.  Flawed Presumptions
Ramseyer contends that prostitution existed in prewar Japan and Korea, 
and that military sexual service was a continuation of the prevailing practic-
es but required greater rewards due to the heightened danger and uncertainty 
of the war. The author notes:
Comfort stations operated as the overseas military analogue to the 
private brothels in Japan and Korea. Whether in Japan or in Korea, 
brothels hired, and women looked for work. The work at stake in 
these transactions involved sexual services, but the economic logic 
to the arrangements that the two parties – brothel and prostitute –
negotiated reflected the resources and alternative opportunities that 
both sides understood each other to hold.
26
24. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 5–7.
25. Kono Statement, supra note 9; Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6–12; ICJ 
Report, supra note 6, at 15; see also Blakemore, supra note 22.
26. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2.
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Characterizing the “comfort stations” as a military analogue to private 
brothels, the author incorrectly presumes that the recruits were freely partic-
ipating in negotiation of the terms of overseas sexual services for the mili-
tary. It is doubtful that the process of recruitment for private brothels was an 
entirely legitimate contractual process, as we further discuss in Part IV, but 
regardless of the practices in private brothels, the recruitment for military 
sexual servitude, rampant with coercion, deception, and manipulation di-
rectly or indirectly supported by public authorities, was not a legitimate con-
tractual process where economic logic could prevail.
The Coomaraswamy Report recounts the widespread use of coercion 
and deceit in the process of recruitment:
As the war continued and the number of Japanese soldiers based in 
various parts of East Asia increased, the demand for military sexual 
slaves increased, so that new methods of recruitment were created. 
This involved the increased use of deception and force in many 
parts of East Asia, and especially in Korea. The testimonies of 
many Korean “comfort women” who have come forward reveals 
the frequency with which coercion or duplicity was employed: a 
considerable number of (mostly Korean) women victims speak in 
their testimonies of the deceit and pretence which were employed 
by the various agents or local collaborators who had been responsi-
ble for their recruitment.
27
Ramseyer contends that the Japanese military did not require additional 
prostitutes as prostitutes had followed armies everywhere.
28
On the contrary, 
however, scholars have estimated that the Japanese military recruited 
100,000 to 200,000 military sex slaves over the course of the entire war,
29
mainly from Korea (mostly fourteen to eighteen years of age).
30
Scholars 
disagree on the precise number,
31
but it is not difficult to see that the mili-
27. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6–12. Other scholars also affirm that the 
women were for the most part duped, abducted or coerced into sexual slavery. See, e.g.,
HICKS, supra note 5, at 18. 
28. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 5. This is refuted by C. Sarah Soh, who states, “It is im-
portant to note at the outset that the majority of the former Korean ‘military comfort women’
(chonggun wianbu in Korean, jugun ianfu in Japanese) were systematically and often coer-
cively recruited by the Japanese forces under the banner of Chongsindae (“Voluntary” Labor 
Service Corps). They were not camp-following prostitutes, as the euphemistic phrase ‘military 
comfort women’ might suggest.” Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Korean “Comfort Women”:
Movement for Redress, 36 ASIAN SURVEY 1226, 1227 (1996).
29. BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA’S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 155 (1997); 
SOH, supra note 5, at 15; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7.
30. SOH, supra note 5, at 15; NORMA, supra note 5, at 131.
31. For example, Yoshimi Yoshiaki estimates that from 50,000 to 200,000 women 
were enslaved. YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 93. Yuki Tanaka suggests from 80,000 to 100,000. 
TANAKA, supra note 5, at 31. Zhiliang Su estimates from 360,000 to 410,000. Number of 
Comfort Stations and Comfort Women, ASIAN WOMEN’S F., https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-
07.html [https://perma.cc/W38F-BP7W]. 
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tary’s demand for sexual servitude would have far exceeded what it could 
have recruited from willing individuals.
The Japanese military wanted to make sexual services available to its 
troops on frontlines where soldiers were experiencing extreme battle 
stress.
32
Field officers made special requests for the recruitment and trans-
portation of comfort women.
33
Given the intensity of the war and the ex-
treme danger evidenced by high levels of casualties, finding individuals 
willing to risk their lives to offer sexual services to frontline soldiers would 
have been an extreme challenge. As the survivor testimonies discussed be-
low indicate, these women did not willingly agree to go to the frontlines. 
The recruitment process could not have been a contractual process freely 
entered into; coercion and deceit were necessary.
34
Japan turned to its colo-
nies, such as Korea, for recruitment. In addition to the practical difficulties 
of recruitment, the Japanese government did not want to hurt morale within 
the Japanese military by forcing Japanese women into sexual slavery at 
“comfort stations,” as it would upset the soldiers to see “Japanese women, 
even relatives, conscripted into the comfort women system.”
35
The level of force and deceit employed increased over time; recruitment 
occurred through large-scale coercion and violent abduction of women in 
what amounted to slave raids in countries under Japanese control.
36
As for 
deception, private operators working for the military would come to the vil-
lages and deceive girls with the promise of well-paid work, including in res-
taurants or as cooks or cleaners for the military.
37
According to a U.S. Of-
fice of War Interrogation Report, Korean women assumed that comfort 
service consisted of visiting wounded soldiers and making the soldiers hap-
py, and many Korean women enlisted without knowing that they would be 
required to offer sexual services.
38
In this deceitful process, not only Korean 
recruiters but agents of the state, such as police and other local authorities, 
32. Reflecting these tensions, there had been a high incidence of rape by Japanese 
troops in China and, in response, a number of Korean women from a Korean community in 
Japan were sent by the Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture to assuage troops in the province. 
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5.
33. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Conse-
quences (Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy) acquired photocopies of original orders con-
taining special requests made by field officers for the recruitment and transportation of com-
fort women. Id. at 15.
34. See YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 112–27.
35. THOMAS J. WARD & WILLIAM D. LAY, PARK STATUE POLITICS: WORLD WAR II
COMFORT WOMEN MEMORIALS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2019); see also NORMA, supra
note 5, at 132.
36. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 
135-137; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 8–9; Argibay, supra note 15, at 377–
99.
37. Id.; see also TANAKA, supra note 5, at 38.
38. YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 105–06.
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were also involved.
39
Deception often accompanied coercion: The police 
would arrive in a village recruiting for the “Women’s Voluntary Service 
Corps,” using the pretext of deploying the recruited women in “war efforts” 
but instead sending them for military sexual service.
40
If the girls recom-
mended as “volunteers” failed to appear, the military police would interro-
gate their reasons for non-compliance, creating a coercive environment.
41
The outcome of this deception was particularly cruel to young Korean 
girls. Many of them did not question the good employment opportunities 
offered to them with assurances from trusted figures such as village authori-
ties, schoolteachers, and police, and in many cases, due to their young age 
and innocence, they did not even have an understanding of prostitution or 
sex.
42
Ramseyer argues that such trickery would not have worked because 
the women and girls would have reported what happened. He states:
. . . it makes implausible any notion that they had been tricked by 
duplicitous recruiters. Trickery works when the target audience 
does not know what is at stake. When young women (or girls) from 
small, closed communities leave for several years and then return, 
they report what happened. Word travels, and others in the commu-
nity learn what the trip entails.
43
We do not know how many of those women were able to return before the 
war ended, but even if some returned, the stigma caused by forced sex 
would have inhibited returning women from reporting their experiences and 
warning other girls of the danger. This was particularly true in Korean cul-
ture where losing one’s virginity meant a young woman would have sub-
stantial difficulty in marrying and having a family should her experiences 
become known. Thus, most of the survivors were concerned principally 
with hiding their experiences and reintegrating into society, although, the 
deception eventually became known to more people.
As the war intensified and suspicion grew among the population, the 
military resorted to undisguised violence, as families resisted calls to recruit 
young women for the military sexual slavery. The level of violence and co-
ercion became extreme; a large number of survivors offered testimonials on 
39. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 8–9.
40. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 8–9.
41. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 8–9.
42. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 8–9.
43. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 4. However, in 1932, fifteen Japanese women were de-
ceived about the terms of their employment by private entrepreneurs and trafficked from Na-
gasaki to a Japanese Naval “comfort station” in Shanghai, China. Alexis Dudden, A Brief Re-
sponse to J. Mark Ramseyer’s “Contracting for Sex,” 65 INT’L REV L. & ECON. (forthcoming 
2021).
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violence used on family members who tried to resist the abduction of their 
daughters.
44
Young women were, in some cases, raped by soldiers in front 
of their parents before being forcibly removed.
45
The following testimony, 
offered by So Gyun Hwang, recollects a cruel incident of deception and vio-
lence during and following her recruitment:
I was born on 28 November 1918 as the second daughter of a day 
labourer. We lived in the Taeri Workers’ District, Kangdong Coun-
ty, Pyongyang City.
When I was 17 years old, in 1936, the head of our village came to 
our house and promised me to help me find a job in a factory. Be-
cause my family was so poor, I gladly accepted this offer of a well-
paid job. I was taken to the railway station in a Japanese truck 
where 20 or so other Korean girls were already waiting. We were 
put on the train, then onto a truck and after a few days’ travel we 
reached a big house at the River Mudinjian in China. I thought it 
was the factory, but I realized that there was no factory. Each girl 
was assigned one small room with a straw bag to sleep on, with a 
number on each door.
After two days of waiting, without knowing what was happening to 
me, a Japanese soldier in army uniform, wearing a sword, came to 
my room. He asked me ‘will you obey my words or not?’, then 
pulled my hair, put me on the floor and asked me to open my legs. 
He raped me. When he left, I saw there were 20 or 30 more men 
waiting outside. They all raped me that day. From then on, every 
night I was assaulted by 15 to 20 men.
We had to undergo medical examinations regularly. Those who 
were found disease-stricken were killed and buried in unknown 
places. One day, a new girl was put in the compartment next to me. 
She tried to resist the men and bit one of them in his arm. She was 
then taken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was 
cut off with a sword and her body was cut into small pieces.
46
The ICJ report introduces the following statement from the Philippines re-
garding another victim, Francisca Austari, aged seventy at the time of the 
investigation, demonstrating a similar pattern of coercion:
Ms. Austari was born in Santa Cruz, Laguna, on 2 December 1923. 
She was the eldest child in her family; her father was a tenant 
farmer and because of the family’s economic circumstances she 
was only able to attend school from first to third grade.
44. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 3; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 9. 
45. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7.
46. Id. at 10.
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Sometime in 1941, a Filipino approached Ms. Austari while she 
and some other girls were washing clothes by a river bank. She 
heard the other women scream out “the Japanese are coming”; they 
all began to run but she was too slow and a Filipino man grabbed 
her. He told her she was going to go and wash clothes for the Japa-
nese soldiers who were camped in the nearby town. Japanese sol-
diers were present when this occurred. For the first three months 
that she was at the encampment. Ms. Austari did wash clothes and 
was told by the Filipino (referred to by Filipinos as a Makapili, 
which denotes someone who collaborated with the Japanese or is a 
supporter of the Japanese) that money was being given to her 
mother for her work. He said that the money being given to her 
mother came from the Japanese but was handed over by him.
After about three months she was told that no more money would 
be forthcoming; at this point she refused to wash clothes any long-
er. Following this the Japanese soldiers took her inside the barracks 
and raped her. That night five or six Japanese soldiers, one after the 
other, had forcible intercourse with her. She attempted to resist 
their attacks on her and was beaten by the soldiers. At various times 
in the month that followed she would try to close her legs and pre-
vent the Japanese from having intercourse with her. Each time that 
this happened she was hit and the soldiers would pound on her, par-
ticularly her legs, and force her to have intercourse. When ques-
tioned about the manner in which intercourse occurred, Ms. Austari 
indicated that she was forced to have intercourse in different posi-
tions with the Japanese, although most commonly she was forced to 
have her legs raised in the air.
This occurred each night for the next two or three months. She was 
the only woman in the military camp and was kept inside a room; 
she was not allowed to go out and was accompanied by a guard 
when she went to the toilet. Each night soldiers, sometimes two, 
sometimes five, would come to her room already naked and have 
forcible intercourse.
47
Both survivor testimonies and the other evidence of sexual slavery make 
clear that recharacterizing this systemic exploitation as contractual arrange-
ments freely entered into is both deeply troubling and inconsistent with 
what actually occurred.
47. ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 56–57. For further evidence, see, for example, Vinuya 
et al., in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization” v. The Honorable 
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo et al., G.R. No. 162230 (Apr. 28, 2010); Vinuya et 
al., in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization” v. The Honorable 
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo et al., G.R. No. 162230 (Aug. 13, 2014).
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B. Disconnect Between Brothels and the Forced Sex Stations
The preceding discussion has shown that a contractual process is not 
relevant to the coercive and deceitful recruitment for military sexual servi-
tude at issue here. There is a clear disconnect between prewar prostitution 
and forced sexual slavery because the victims of the sexual slavery did not 
have a choice to engage in contract negotiations. Moreover, as we detail be-
low, it is possible that Japan may have strategically recruited a large number 
of young Korean women to weaken the morale of Koreans who did not wel-
come Japanese rule and to undermine its national and cultural identities.
48
Thus, while it is possible that, as Ramseyer contends, some women at some 
stations, particularly in the early stages of the war, may have managed to 
avoid the atrocities described in the testimonies above,
49
for the vast majori-
ty, what occurred was sexual servitude through coercion or deceit.
The author’s failure to acknowledge the presence of such sexual servi-
tude is grossly inappropriate as it subsumes the large number of victims of 
sexual slavery under the author’s description of willing sex workers who 
negotiated for money. The article makes this flawed connection between the 
practices of private brothels and the forced sex stations because it fails to 
acknowledge that the recruitment of the victims was carried out in a system-
atic and coordinated way involving private operators, members of the po-
lice, the military, schools, and local authorities to meet the increasing mili-
tary demand for sexual services. The author contends that concern for 
venereal disease was the reason for setting up the forced sex stations (“com-
fort stations”).
50
Although there was such a concern, it was the increasing 
rapes by Japanese military personnel and the resulting loss of military disci-
pline that led to the establishment of these stations throughout the front-
lines.
51
This meant that the Japanese military required a large number of in-
dividuals providing sexual service for the military, a demand on a scale that 
48. The Period of Wartime Mandatory Draft Through Elimination of Ethnicity, NAT’L 
INST. KOREAN HIST., http://contents.history.go.kr/mobile/nh/view.do?levelId=nh_047_0020_
0030_0010_0030 [https://perma.cc/RF5S-CYN9] (in Korean). Rape has been used as political 
means of subjugation and even genocide. See, e.g., Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a 
Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the 
Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348 (1998); Jennifer L. Green, Uncovering Collective 
Rape: A Comparative Study of Political Sexual Violence, 34 INT’L J. SOC. 97 (2004); Sherrie 
L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 350 (2003); Rachel 
A. Sitkin, Bandy X. Lee & Grace Lee, To Destroy a People: Sexual Violence as a Form of 
Genocide in the Conflicts of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Chile, 46 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
219 (2019); Catherine A. Mackinnon, Genocide’s Sexuality, 46 POL. EXCL. & DOMIN. 313
(2005); Shayna Rogers, Sexual Violence or Rape as a Constituent Act of Genocide: Lessons 
from The Ad Hoc Tribunals and a Prescription for the International Criminal Court, 48 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265 (2016).
49. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
50. Ramseyer, supra note supra note 1, at 4.
51. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; Argibay, supra note 15, at 376–77
(2003); TANAKA, supra note 5, at 10–11.
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could not be met by willing individuals, to suppress cases of rape that would 
undermine military discipline and increase resistance from local residents in 
occupied territories.
Another possible motive–weakening the Korean morale and undermin-
ing of its cultural and national identities–renders the practices of private
brothels even more irrelevant to the forced sex stations, going beyond re-
cruiting individuals who would offer sexual services as in brothels. By put-
ting so many Korean women into sexual slavery, the Japanese military 
caused not only extreme mental trauma but also substantial reproductive is-
sues among many victims due to venereal diseases and the infliction of oth-
er physical violence.
52
The Japanese authorities, who had closely monitored 
the stations on frontlines, could not have been unaware of the critical effect 
that brutal sexual servitude had on the large group of Korean women vic-
tims. As a result, the organized, large-scale sexual slavery of Korean women 
can be construed as an act of oppression intended to subjugate Korean peo-
ple,
53
who did not welcome Japanese rule in the Korean peninsula,
54
espe-
cially when viewed in conjunction with other oppressive measures that the 
Japanese government had adopted to suppress the morale of Korean people 
and eliminate their national and cultural identities.
55
The sexual slavery perpetrated by Japan was a crime against humani-
ty.
56
The system of sexual slavery breached the 1921 International Conven-
52. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 7; see also Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 13.
53. See supra note 48 (discussing rapes used as a political means of subjugation and
genocide).
54. Koreans initiated a nation-wide, peaceful protest for independence on March 1, 
1919 (“March 1 Movement”) and continued their struggle to obtain independence from Japan. 
Koreans also set up a provisional government in Shanghai, China, in April of 1919. See
HENRY CHUNG, THE CASE OF KOREA: A COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE ON THE JAPANESE 
DOMINATION OF KOREA, AND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT (2014).
55. For example, the Japanese adopted policies to ban Korean language in schools, 
compelled the change of Korean names into Japanese, and mobilized Koreans for war efforts 
in the forms of forced labor, sexual slavery, and the military draft. See Soh, supra note 28, at 
1228. Ramseyer incorrectly states that Koreans were not drafted into the Japanese army, even 
though Korea was part of the Japanese nation. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 7. Korea was never 
a legitimate part of the Japanese nation; Japan forcibly annexed Korea in 1910; thus, Korea 
was under Japanese occupation. Also, Koreans were subject to the military draft beginning in 
1944. Brandon Palmer, Imperial Japan’s Preparations to Conscript Koreans as Soldiers, 
1942—1945, 31 KOREAN STUD. 63 (2007).
56. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 155; 
McDougall Report, supra note 7, at 18–19; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 
21–22. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines crimes 
against humanity as:
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: mur-
der; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; im-
prisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamen-
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tion for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (Japan rati-
fied this treaty in 1925)
57
and norms of customary international law which 
were subsequently enshrined in the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”).
58
The 
Coomaraswamy Report introduces a view that the sexual slavery enforced 
by Japan was “carried out with intent to destroy a particular national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group, causing bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life to bring 
about its physical destruction and imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group, constituting genocide in accordance with article II 
of the Genocide Convention.”
59
Japan has objected to this argument, contending that these instruments, 
the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of 
War Victims, did not exist during the Second World War.
60
However, it is 
widely acknowledged that these treaties codified existing norms of custom-
ary international law.
61
Similarly, it has been recognized that prior to the 
tal rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under interna-
tional law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of 
apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002, art. 7 
[hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
57. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 12; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 157; Am-
nesty International Report, supra note 6, at 19–20; Argibay, supra note 15, at 375.
58. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 12.
59. Id. at 13; see also The Period of Wartime Mandatory Draft Through Elimination of 
Ethnicity, supra note 48.
60. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16.
61. The Secretary-General of the United Nations affirmed this principle in 1993. He 
stated: 
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crime 
sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the 
problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not 
arise [. . .] The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has be-
yond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in 
armed conflict as embodied in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the 
Protection of War Victims: the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 
1945.
Winter 2021] The Fallacy of Contract in Sexual Slavery 305
war, sexual slavery was understood to be a violation of customary interna-
tional law.
62
The political and legal dimensions of sexual slavery indicate that the ra-
tionale that may exist for private brothels would have little or no relevance 
to the circumstances of the enforced sex stations, affirming the disconnect 
between prewar prostitution and sexual slavery. As such, the author’s exam-
ination of the contractual dynamics of private brothels does not offer any 
understanding or insight into the operation of military sexual service during 
the war.
III.  Brutality in the Forced Sex Station (“Comfort Station”)
A. Mistreatment, Torture, and Killing
The Ramseyer article describes the forced sex station as an agreeable 
workplace where sexual services were rendered for stipulated terms and 
promised pay.
63
It adds that the girls were able to save their pay, although 
some station owners may have “cheated” their prostitutes, and the author 
also introduces an episode of a “comfort woman” who became popular and 
was satisfied with earnings that had not been available to her at home.
64
As 
sources of these stories, the article appears to rely on controversial accounts 
of Koreans published in Japan advocating that military sexual servitude was 
a legitimate service.
65
However, more comprehensive investigative reports detail horrendous 
conditions at the forced sex stations.
66
Based on the testimonies of the vic-
tims forced to work at the stations, the reports conclude that the conditions 
under which they served the soldiers were almost invariably appalling.
67
The 
quality of their accommodation and general treatment may have varied, but 
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). In support of the posi-
tion that Japan’s sexual slavery is a war crime, in December 1996, the United States Justice 
Department, without disclosing names, put sixteen Japanese involved with comfort women 
and Unit 731, which was linked to biological warfare in China, on a list of war criminals and 
barred them from entering the country. Wakabayashi, supra note 7, at 228.
62. See also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; Rule 93. Rape and Other 
Forms of Sexual Violence, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org
/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93, [https://perma.cc/66HS-49UL].
63. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
64. Id. at 6.
65. See KILSUNG CHOE, THE TRUTH ABOUT COMFORT WOMEN, AS SEEN BY A 
KOREAN RECEPTIONIST (2017); YU-HA PARK, COMFORT WOMEN OF THE EMPIRE (2014).
66. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7, 
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
67. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7, 
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
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almost all survivors testified to harshness and cruelty.
68
The accommoda-
tions were generally poor, consisting of tents or temporary wooden shacks 
in frontline positions, often with only mattresses on the floor, exposed to 
unhealthy cold and damp conditions.
69
In relatively safer locations, the vic-
tims had rooms in one or two-story buildings, but these were no more than 
cramped, narrow cubicles, as small as three by five feet, space barely suffi-
cient for a bed.
70
The victims also faced severe restrictions on their freedom of move-
ment. Ramseyer’s article states that “even overseas, women who disliked 
their jobs at a brothel could – and did – simply disappear.”
71
However, this 
could not be further from the truth in regard to the forced sex stations. The 
sites were usually patrolled and guarded by barbed wire fences, and the 
women’s movements were closely monitored and restricted. It was the life 
of a prisoner – many survivors testified that they were never allowed to 
leave the camp or were only allowed to walk outside at set times.
72
Some of 
them could make occasional trips to have their hair cut or even to see a film, 
but the victims were under strict control and monitoring; escape, which 
would have resulted in severe punishment, was nearly impossible.
73
These young women were subjected to inhumane treatment: They were 
required to submit to as many as sixty to seventy men per day
74
and were 
abused, tortured, and even killed by soldiers and officers who often ignored 
regulations.
75
Health checks were carried out regularly, primarily to prevent 
the spread of venereal diseases, but little notice or care was given to the fre-
quent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones that 
solders inflicted on their victims.
76
Their cruel treatment, which would have 
surely deterred anyone else from applying for the job, is another indication 
that there was indeed no contractual process but, instead, coercion and de-
ception in recruitment.
77
68. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7, 
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
69. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 47.
70. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 15, 48.
71. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
72. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50; 
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
73. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50; 
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
74. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
75. Id. at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50; Amnesty International Report, 
supra note 6, at 10–13.
76. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50; 
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
77. See also Stanley et al., supra note 16; Cho, supra note 16.
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The young women were supposed to be paid for their “services,” as the 
author contends,
78
but the vast majority never saw any of the money that 
they had been promised.
79
Such non-payment would obviously deter any fu-
ture transactions with willing individuals, but the military would not have 
been concerned with that. Military officials did not rely on any contractual 
process, but rather on deception and coercion, compelling Korean women to 
comply to avoid a severe punishment or even death to themselves or their 
family members. The author asserts that women could be “unpleasant” to 
avoid demands on them,
80
but in a place where they were subject to rampant 
violence and savagery, such a response surely would have risked harsh pun-
ishment or even death,
81
as the following testimony by Ju Hwang Kim, a 
survivor who served at one of the stations, illustrates:
I thought I was drafted as a labour worker when, at the age of 17, 
the Japanese village leader’s wife ordered all unmarried Korean 
girls to go to work at a Japanese military factory. I worked there for 
three years, until the day that I was asked to follow a Japanese sol-
dier into his tent. He told me to take my clothes off. I resisted be-
cause I was so scared, I was still a virgin. But he just ripped my 
skirt and cut my underwear from my body with a gun which had a 
knife attached to it. At that point I fainted. And when I woke up 
again, I was covered with a blanket but there was blood every-
where.
From then on, I realized that during the first year I, like all the other 
Korean girls with me, was ordered to service high-ranking officials, 
and as time passed, and as we were more and more ‘used’, we 
served lower-ranking officers. If a woman got a disease, she usually 
vanished. We were also given ‘606-shots’ so that we would not get 
pregnant or that any pregnancies would result in miscarriage.
We only received clothes two times per year and not enough food, 
only rice cakes and water. I was never paid for my ‘services’. I 
worked for five years as a ‘comfort woman’, but all my life I suf-
fered from it. My intestines are mostly removed because they were 
infected so many times, I have not been able to have intercourse 
because of the painful and shameful experiences. I cannot drink 
milk or fruit juices without feeling sick because it reminds me too 
much of those dirty things they made me do.
82
78. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
79. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
80. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
81. “Yet some women still tried to refuse being made sexual slaves. Their resistance 
was met by force, often by torture, in order to get their consent, and some were maimed or 
killed.” TANAKA, supra note 5, at 50.
82. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
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A testimony of another survivor, Ok Sun Chung, vividly illustrates the 
point that nothing short of absolute obedience ensured their survival:
[. . .] I was taken to the Japanese army garrison barracks in Heysan 
City. There were around 400 other Korean young girls with me and 
we had to serve over 5,000 Japanese soldiers as sex slaves every 
day – up to 40 men per day. Each time I protested, they hit me or 
stuffed rags in my mouth. One held a matchstick to my private 
parts until I obeyed him. My private parts were oozing with blood.
One Korean girl who was with us once demanded why we had to 
serve so many, up to 40, men per day. To punish her for her ques-
tioning, the Japanese company commander Yamamoto ordered her 
to be beaten with a sword. While we were watching, they took off 
her clothes, tied her legs and hands and rolled her over a board with 
nails until the nails were covered with blood and pieces of her 
flesh. In the end, they cut off her head. Another Japanese, Yama-
moto, told us that “it’s easy to kill you all, easier than killing dogs”. 
He also said “since those Korean girls are crying because they have 
not eaten, boil the human flesh and make them eat it”.
One Korean girl caught a venereal disease from being raped so of-
ten and, as a result, over fifty Japanese soldiers were infected. In 
order to stop the disease from spreading and to “sterilize” the Kore-
an girl, they stuck a hot iron bar in her private parts.
83
As these testimonies illustrate, the young women in the forced sex sta-
tions established by and for the Japanese military were subjected to horrific 
violations of their most basic human rights. Clearly, they were not partici-
pating in any form of voluntary employment.
B. Lasting Wounds
The preceding discussion reveals the extent of cruelty and mistreatment 
that young women had to endure at the forced sex stations. It was the life of 
a slave in the worst possible form where the concepts that the author enter-
tains, such as contract or contractual reward, had absolutely no relevance. 
The episode of a content Korean “comfort woman” introduced by the Ram-
seyer article, who enjoyed her popularity, savings, and shopping opportuni-
ties in town,
84
and the diametrically opposite testimonies of the horrific ex-
periences introduced in this article might suggest that we are discussing 
wholly separate events. However, the testimonies offered by a large number 
of survivors are consistent in their descriptions of the brutality. The horrible 
suffering reported by the victims is also consistent with that reported by Al-
83. Id. at 9.
84. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
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lied soldiers captured by the Japanese army during the war.
85
In short, the 
mistreatment reported by the victims, as horrific as it may be, is consistent 
with the abusive conduct of the Japanese military during the war.
86
It has been over seventy-five years since the end of the war, but the 
wounds inflicted by sexual enslavement on a massive scale continue with 
the few survivors of the tragedy still alive today and with many others who 
share their pain. Long after the war, survivors continued to suffer from ex-
treme trauma and physical pain resulting from sexual abuse. For example, a 
survivor was exposed to numerous venereal diseases when serving as a mili-
tary sexual slave, and as a result her son was born after the war with a men-
tal disability.
87
In the conservative Korean culture where sexuality was not a 
subject of public discussion, survivors also endured a deeply entrenched 
sense of shame,
88
which is one of the reasons that their testimonies were not 
made public until the 1990s, by which time Korean society had become 
more open and ready to acknowledge the wounds of the past.
Memories of the horrific past are not the only source of the wounds. At-
tempts to deny responsibility for the atrocities and to rewrite history, such as 
the one advanced by Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, aggravate the 
wounds, and this is the reason that we felt compelled to write this article. 
The Japanese government offered the Kono Statement in 1993, in which it 
admitted the involvement of the Japanese military and administration in the 
recruitment and management of the forced sex stations and acknowledged 
that the victims “lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmos-
phere.”
89
The Japanese acknowledgment was not complete, as it did not ad-
mit its legal responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Kono Statement, which the 
Ramseyer article never mentions, was a move in the right direction, one 
which could have opened a pathway to the healing of wounds and the be-
ginning of reconciliation.
However, the Japanese government did not stay the course. As more 
conservative factions subsequently took power, the political environment in 
Japan favored the denunciation of war-related responsibilities. Thus, for ex-
ample, in 2014, the Japanese government demanded that the United Nations 
amend the Coomaraswamy Report, but this demand was rejected.
90
Japan 
85. See, e.g., Liz Bestic, The Japanese Torture of My Father Was Horrific — So Why 
Are They Considering Watering Down the Apology for Their Wartime Past?, INDEPENDENT




87. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 7. Amnesty International also reports that 
nearly all Korean survivors that they met had been unable to have children due to internal in-
juries caused by mass rape, or as a result of contracting STDs which went untreated. Amnesty 
International Report, supra note 6, at 13.
88. See also Soh, supra note 28, at 1230.
89. Kono Statement, supra note 9.
90. Panda, supra note 21.
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subsequently offered an official apology for the pain and suffering inflicted 
on the victims in the name of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a part of a 
2015 Korea-Japan Agreement on “Comfort Women.”
91
Opposition to this 
Agreement arose in Korea based on Japan’s failure to admit its legal liabili-
ties.
92
Nonetheless, the Japanese government still has the opportunity to 
seek reconciliatory solutions to heal the wounds. The Coomaraswamy Re-
port, over two decades ago, recommended that the Japanese government ac-
cept legal responsibility for violating its obligations under international law 
by establishing and managing the forced sex stations and make full disclo-
sure of the documents and materials in its possession with regard to the sta-
tions and other related activities.
93
We believe that this is a necessary di-
mension of the healing process.
Lastly, we wish to point out that the denial of responsibility by the Jap-
anese government is not the only source of these lasting wounds. Some 
members of the conservative factions in Japanese society, as well as their 
collaborators in Japan and overseas, have issued statements and published 
materials, mischaracterizing the victims, as the Ramseyer article has done, 
as willing sex workers.
94
Attacks on victims, personal and otherwise, have 
been made to discredit their testimonies.
95
Episodes of women who were 
supposedly better treated at the stations have been introduced and empha-
sized, as the Ramseyer article has also done, without any qualification, as if 
such stories in fact represented the general state of the stations. Tragically, 
mischaracterizations, falsifications, and insults exacerbate the harm that has 
been done.
96
91. Yuki Tatsumi, Japan, South Korea Reach Agreement on ‘Comfort Women,
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 28, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-south-korea-reach-
agreement-on-comfort-women/.
92. Misato Nagakawa & Trevor P. Kennedy, Public Divided over ‘Comfort Women’
Agreement, E. ASIA F. (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/22/public-divided-over-comfort-women-agreement/. 
93. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 22.
94. See supra note 65 (listing examples of such authors).
95. The Coomaraswamy Report observes that some rejected the testimonies of the vic-
tims as “anecdotal or even created to implicate the Government in a matter which was essen-
tially a private and, therefore, a privately run, system of prostitution” (emphasis added). Coo-
maraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. Additionally, Japanese civil society groups, such as the 
Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, have made public statements and submissions 
to the United Nations accusing the victims of lying and calling them “crooks.” Letter dated 
May 27, 2020 from the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform to the U.N. addressed 
to the Secretary-General, A Deceitful Korean Citizens’ Group (NGO) and the Comfort Wom-
en Issue, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/NGO/X (May 2020), http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL
/Deceitfule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D4E-7RGX].
96. Thus, Ramseyer’s article has provoked intense protests and objections, not only in 
Korea, but across the United States and within his own institution. Scholars such as Yuji Ho-
saka (Sejong University), Carter J. Eckert (Harvard University), Alexis Dudden (University of 
Connecticut), Pyong Gap Min (City University of New York), Noah R. Feldman (Harvard 
Law School), and Katharine H.S. Moon (Wellesley College) have raised objections to his ar-
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IV. Fallacy of Contract Arguments
A. Defects in Arguments
1. Flawed Application of Game Theory
The Ramseyer article attempts to explain “the contract dynamics” of the 
transactions between prostitutes and brothel owners which, it claims, “re-
flected the straightforward logic of the credible commitments so basic to el-
ementary game theory.”
97
According to the article, the unique features of 
these transactions that cannot be found in other industries – such as large 
advances made to prostitutes or their families (e.g., parents), higher incomes 
conditional upon compliance with the incentive structure (i.e., higher pay 
for a greater number of customers served), fixed duration (with an option to 
quit early upon generation of sufficient revenue) – are integral parts of the 
contractual dynamics that can be explained by game theory: The women 
demanded a large portion of their pay upfront with knowledge that the 
brothel owners had an incentive to exaggerate their future earnings, and the 
owners demanded a contractual structure that gave women incentives to 
work hard, knowing they would be inclined to shirk.
98
This is a flawed application of game theory that fits the realities of nei-
ther prostitution “contracts” in Japan and elsewhere that the article refer-
ences, nor military sexual servitude during the war.
99
Game theory is the 
study of the ways in which individual choices are made in expectation of the 
choices of others to produce an optimal outcome.
100
As such, the key pre-
sumption of game theory is that the actors have choices regarding their 
courses of action. Thus, game theory would not be applicable, and the con-
tract dynamics the author purports to have existed would not stand, unless 
the women and brothel owners had agency concerning their own actions.
Such choice did not exist for women involved in a large number of so-
called prostitution “contracts” in Japan and elsewhere or for the victims of 
sexual slavery who were either forced into sexual servitude or induced by 
guments for being defective and incorrect. Ariel H. Kim & Simon J. Levien, Harvard Profes-
sor’s Paper Claiming ‘Comfort Women’ in Imperial Japan Were Voluntarily Employed Stokes 
International Controversy, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.thecrimson.com
/article/2021/2/7/hls-paper-international-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/2AD6-2KYK]; see 
also Dudden, supra note 43.
97. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
98. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the economic considerations surrounding 
prostitution, see Peter G. Moffatt, Economics of Prostitution, in ECONOMICS UNCUT: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO LIFE, DEATH, AND MISADVENTURE 193, 202–11 (Simon W. Bowmaker 
ed., 2005).
99. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2–5.
100. John Nash first developed game theory in the 1950s. John Nash, The Bargaining 
Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950), cited in Yong-Shik Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the 
WTO Multilateral Trading System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Devel-
opment Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD TRADE, 625, 639 (2011).
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deception (e.g., on promises of non-sexual jobs). With respect to the prewar 
prostitution that the Ramseyer article describes, a number of young girls 
were “sold” by their families to brothels, without having a chance to review 
the terms of their “contracts” and understand them properly, if there was 
such a contract, not to mention having a chance to decide their courses of 
action in expectation of the actions to be taken by brothel owners.
101
An epi-
sode of a ten-year-old “deciding” to enter prostitution, which the author 
cites as an example of bargaining,
102
is tragic – if such episode were to be 
true – and it does not support the argument that women chose to work as 
prostitutes. In addition to the obvious moral issues involving a child con-
senting to prostitution,
103
it is widely accepted that one may not bind minors 
under contract.
104
Some young women may have acquiesced and even agreed to go to 
brothels in response to the lure of better food, clothing, the glamours of the 
city, or the opportunity to help their family, but they were hardly the active 
negotiators that game theory presupposes. The victims of sexual slavery 
during the Second World War who were recruited by force or deception 
were obviously not in a position to negotiate anything regarding the terms of 
the “contract”; thus, game theory does not explain such circumstances. At 
most, game theory is arguably applicable only to a relatively small number 
of cases in which adult individuals willing to provide sexual services were 
in a position to negotiate in expectation of the actions of the brothel owners. 
This simply was not the case for the victims of sexual slavery or for a large 
number of prewar sex workers.
105
Rather, their exploitation illustrates how 
women in occupied territories were used to further Japanese military objec-
tives.
2. Not a Fair Contract but One to Exploit
Even if one were to accept that there were willing individuals who had 
the opportunity to negotiate, the resulting contracts would not have been 
fair. Harvard law professor Noah R. Feldman recounts that “[t]he economic 
relationship that was deployed, even according to Ramseyer’s own research, 
is very close to what we would ordinarily call debt slavery.”
106
Professor 
Feldman draws parallels between the Japanese context and sharecropping 
contracts in the Jim Crow American South, noting the extent to which such 
101. MIKISO HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS, AND OUTCASTES: THE UNDERSIDE OF 
MODERN JAPAN 207 (1982).
102. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
103. The author recounts that the minimum age for licensed prostitutes in Japan was 
eighteen. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2.
104. See supra note 23 (explaining the rule of contract law that one may not bind a mi-
nor under contract).
105. HANE, supra note 101.
106. Kim & Levien, supra note 96.
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arrangements were designed to exploit and actually did exploit the vast 
power discrepancy between actors and institutions.
107
At the conclusion of the Civil War, slavery was abolished but very few 
formerly enslaved African Americans were able to own land. Most had little 
choice but to enter into sharecropping contracts with landlords – former 
plantation owners – under which they agreed to raise cash crops and give a 
high portion of their harvests, usually fifty percent, to the landowners in ex-
change for use of the land (often twenty to fifty acre plots suitable for farm-
ing by a single family, into which landowners had divided plantations), as 
well as a cabin and supplies. These contracts created a system of economic 
dependency and poverty for sharecroppers: Landowners extended credit to 
sharecroppers to buy goods and charged high interest rates, sometimes as 
high as seventy percent a year.
108
Sharecropping contracts were thus a de-
vice of exploitation – a form of debt slavery – across the American South.
The prostitution contracts discussed in the Ramseyer article have a 
similarly exploitative structure: Women “choosing” to work in prostitution 
received a large sum up front, according to the author, but it was a loan, and 
the women were required to work off the loan in a form of indentured servi-
tude. The author describes them as “a multi-year indenture agreement that 
bundled an up-front advance, additional cash compensation, a maximum 
term, and the right to quit working early if a woman generated enough reve-
nue.”
109
In this arrangement, most of the revenue generated by the women 
would be taken by brothel owners, who claimed their own share (as high as 
two-thirds to three-quarters of the revenue according to the author), their 
loan repayment (sixty percent of the remainder), and the cost of food and 
accommodation.
110
As Professor Feldman explains, it was a system of exploitation, rather 
than a fair contract.
111
He opines that game theory should account for the 
way “contracts” between people of vastly different power can increase pow-
er differentials and reduce people to the status of debt slavery,
112
but Ram-
seyer failed to show this outcome in his analysis. Loaning a family more 
money than it could ever pay back is an effective tool for forcing the fami-
ly’s daughter to continue doing coerced sex work.
113
In other words, the 
form of the “contract” is itself a means of coercion. When an employment 
107. Id.
108. Isham G. Bailey, Sharecropper Contract, 1867, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/share
cropper-contract-1867 (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
109. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
110. Id. at 2. 
111. Kim & Levien, supra note 96.
112. Correspondence on file with the lead author.
113. Id.
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contract does not allow for the employee to stop working (until the employ-
er is ready to let the employee go), that relationship is one of enslavement.
114
 
B.  Unfeasibility of Contractual Recruitment 
Ramseyer’s contractual approach fails to explain the conditions of mili-
tary sexual servitude during the Second World War. It is unrealistic to think 
that any person would freely accept such a contract. The author underesti-
mates the massive risks and dangers that a woman would have had to accept 
to provide sexual services on the frontlines during the war and the size of 
the reward that would have had to be offered, should any women have been 
inclined to agree to such a contract. Yet he writes: 
For these short but potentially dangerous assignments, the brothels 
paid (annual) wages much higher than those at the Tokyo brothels. 
Typically, for the two-year job they paid several hundred yen up-
front. Sample contracts for Japanese women recruited to Shanghai 
comfort stations in 1937 provided advances of 500 to 1,000 yen 
(Naimusho, 1938). Similarly, Home Ministry documents from 1938 
report Japanese women travelling to the Shanghai comfort stations 
on 600–700 yen advances, with one woman receiving an advance 
in the 700-800 yen range, and two in the 300-500 yen range (Nai-
musho, 1938). 
Note what this means: in compensation for the much higher risks 
involved, prostitutes at the comfort stations earned much higher 
pay. Domestic prostitutes in Korea and Japan already earned con-
siderably more than they would earn in other employment. Recall 
that those in Japan earned 1000 yen to 1200 yen on six year terms. 
 
 114. The circumstances under which Korean “comfort women” were exploited in World 
War II also would meet the definition of “trafficking in persons.” See Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing 
the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/49 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter “Trafficking Protocol”]. The Trafficking 
Protocol defines human trafficking as: 
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person hav-
ing control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or other services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
Id. art. 3(a). Although the Trafficking Protocol was adopted in 2000, international law prohib-
ited human trafficking prior to World War II. See infra note 120. 
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At the comfort stations prostitutes from Japan earned 600-700 yen 
on two year terms.
115
The amount of compensation offered in the early stages of the war may 
have been higher than the contemporary earnings available in Japan (which 
by no means affirms the existence of a contract for women who were forced 
or deceived), but it would have been extremely difficult to recruit on the 
same terms in the later stages of the war where hostilities intensified and the 
dangers on the frontlines were heightened. These dangers would have in-
cluded not only injury or death from the typical conditions of battlefields, 
such as bombing, gunfire, physical assaults by enemies, disease, and food 
poisoning, but also the acts of Japanese soldiers. There were frequent in-
stances of soldiers and officials ignoring regulations, trying to stay longer 
with the victims and often inflicting physical injury on them (e.g., cigarette 
burns, bruises, bayonet stab wounds, and even broken bones, as described 
above).
116
There were no assurances against the occurrence of such brutality for 
anyone serving at the frontline stations. Considering the extent of the dan-
ger, the cost of recruitment of willing individuals would have been prohibi-
tively high as the war intensified; advances would have had to be high 
enough to be worth risking death in a treacherous place far away from 
home. In such circumstances, it simply would not have been feasible to re-
cruit a sufficient number of individuals to offer sexual services on the front-
lines by a contractual process. Prostitutes, according to the author’s account, 
already making higher wages than those engaged other trades in their home 
countries, would have little incentive to take such enormous risks.
Thus, a non-contractual method was necessary: Just as a draft was nec-
essary to forcibly recruit men to fight on the frontlines, a “draft” was also 
necessary to meet the Japanese military’s requirement for sexual services 
where very few, if any, would have willingly volunteered (even for purport-
ed strong compensation) due to the extreme dangers of the intensifying war. 
This explains why violent and atrocious methods were used to recruit vic-
tims from Korea and elsewhere. The author’s contract approach is no more 
than a fallacy that relies on underestimating the dangers of the intensifying 
war and on the false presumption that the majority of those who offered 
sexual services on the frontline had an opportunity to negotiate the terms of 
115. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
116. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.




 Not surprisingly, no one has been able to locate any proof 
of the existence of such contract with “comfort women” to date.
118
 
V.  Human Rights Implications 
The sexual slavery perpetrated by the Japanese military during the Sec-
ond World War is among the most atrocious wartime human rights viola-
tions of the twentieth century. As many as 200,000 women from Korea and 
other occupied countries were exploited,
119
 and they suffered a breadth of 
harm including inhumane treatment, torture, and, in some cases, even death. 
The victims were recruited by force or deception, with the involvement of 
the Japanese military or government. The Japanese military was involved 
with the management of the “comfort stations” and thus was responsible for 
the atrocities committed therein. The resulting wounds from these human 
rights violations remained with the survivors, their families, and many oth-
ers who share their pain even to this day. 
As discussed earlier, the conduct of the Japanese military in the re-
cruitment and the management of the “comfort women” system violated in-
ternational human rights law, including the 1921 International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children,
120
 and was in-
consistent with principles of international humanitarian law and internation-
al human rights law later enshrined in the Geneva Conventions for the Pro-
tection of War Victims and the Genocide Convention, respectively.
121
 Japan 
has denied legal responsibility, noting that the Genocide Convention and 
Geneva Conventions did not yet exist during the Second World War.
122
 
However, this contention does not relieve Japan of liability under interna-
tional law, because the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions 
 
 117. Katharine H.S. Moon, a professor of Asian studies and political science at Welles-
ley College, also states that Ramseyer’s claim ignores the context in which women entered 
into contracts. She questions how we may “explain whether a 14- or 16-year-old girl knew 
what she was signing even if she signed it, especially in a Korean society at the time that was 
not accustomed to contracts and related legalism and didn’t grant such agency to girls and 
women.” Kim & Levien, supra note 96. 
 118. Stanley et al., supra note 16; see, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, Seeking the True Story 
of the Comfort Women: How a Harvard Professor’s Dubious Scholarship Reignited a History 
of Mistrust Between South Korea and Japan, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2021), 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/seeking-the-true-story-of-the-comfort-
women-j-mark-ramseyer. 
 119. CUMINGS, supra note 29, at 155; SOH supra note 5, at 15; ICJ Report, supra note 6, 
at 7; YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 93; H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 120. See 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women 
and Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415; see also International Agreement for the Sup-
pression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83, entered 
into force 18 July 1905; International Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave 
Traffic,” May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 1912 GR. Brit. T.S. No. 20. 
 121. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 122. See also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16. 
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codified existing norms of customary international law,
123
and sexual slavery 
was understood to be a violation of customary international law.
124
It is also worth noting a 1998 ruling by a Japanese court (the Shimono-
seki Branch of the Yamaguchi District Court) that the comfort women sys-
tem constituted discrimination based on gender and ethnicity and that the 
system violated the Japanese Constitution’s guarantee that “[a]ll of the peo-
ple shall be respected as individuals.”
125
While the court did not specifically 
rule that the Japanese government violated international law, it is significant 
that the Japanese court affirmed the breach of fundamental human rights 
caused by the military’s practice of sexual slavery.
The Japanese government has continuing obligations to acknowledge 
and provide redress to the women who were coerced into participating in 
this system of sexual slavery and to their families. These obligations are 
enumerated in the “Basic Principles and Guidelines” on redress for viola-
tions of the most serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
promulgated by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005.
126
They recognize that 
victims and survivors must be treated with respect and dignity, accorded ac-
cess to justice, and provided “adequate, effective and prompt reparation.”
127
In addition to measures of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation, 
those subjected to gross violations of human rights and serious violations of 
humanitarian law—as the women at issue here were—are entitled to redress 
that takes less tangible forms. These include, but are not limited to, 
“[v]erification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth,” “[a]n 
official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation 
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the vic-
tim,” a “[p]ublic apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and ac-
ceptance of responsibility,” and the “[i]nclusion of an accurate account of 
the violations that occurred” in educational materials.
128
These are steps that 
the Japanese government can still take, measures that would provide a be-
lated but nonetheless highly significant indication of respect for internation-
al human rights and international humanitarian law. By contrast, the rewrit-
123. Wakabayashi, supra note 7, at 228.
124. See Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; see also Rome Statute, supra note 
56, art. 7. Prohibitions on sexual servitude, trafficking, and slavery have also been codified in 
other subsequent international law. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, art. 6, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46), 
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force, Sept. 3, 1981; Trafficking Protocol, supra note 
114, art. 3.
125. Kim & Kim, supra note 11, at 263 n.3; see also discussion of the Japanese court 
case, supra note 11.
126. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Vic-
tims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights law and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (16 Dec. 2005).
127. Id. arts. VI, VII.
128. Id. art. IX secs. 22(b), (d), (e), (h).
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ing of history to erase the experiences of the women subjected to sexual 
slavery undermines this process and denies them even this modicum of re-
spect for their humanity.
129
Disregarding the extensive factual record and applicable human rights 
and humanitarian law, Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War mischaracter-
izes sexual slavery as a legitimate contractual arrangement whereby women 
freely participated in contract negotiations and received greater rewards for 
accepting the dangers of life on the frontline, completely ignoring volumi-
nous evidence to the contrary. As discussed above, the victims did not have 
such a choice. When force was used to secure their recruitment, disobedi-
ence meant severe punishment, including death, to themselves or their fami-
ly members, as testified to by a number of survivors. Once they arrived at 
the stations, they lived as enslaved persons under harsh conditions, deprived 
of their freedom, dignity, and life as human beings. Many of the young 
women, most only fourteen to eighteen years of age, did not make it back 
home. (According to one study, ninety percent did not survive the war.)
130
Contracts were never a part of this cruel process.
131
VI. Conclusion
We believe that the mischaracterization of history in the Ramseyer arti-
cle fits squarely within a long line of attempts to deny the existence of war-
time atrocities and rewrite history. Realizing this danger, the Kono State-
ment made the following commitment:
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above in-
stead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. 
We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same 
mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through 
the study and teaching of history.
132
Had the Japanese government implemented this resolve, teaching histo-
ry as it truly occurred and affirming its position domestically and overseas, 
there would have been an opportunity for these wounds to heal, at least to 
some extent. If such efforts had been made, perhaps we would not have to 
face ongoing efforts to recharacterize and erase exploitation – a process that 
inflicts additional injury on the victims and survivors and on all of us who 
share their pain.
Unfortunately, subsequent conservative Japanese administrations, such 
as that of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, retreated from this resolve, 
129. While beyond the scope of this article, we note that similar practices aimed at re-
writing history and erasing human rights violations occur in other contexts, and that any such 
efforts to suppress the truth of human rights atrocities must be resisted. 
130. Blakemore, supra note 22.
131. See Stanley et al., supra note 16; Cho, supra note 16.
132. Kono Statement, supra note 9.
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and reconciliation is now further away. We believe that we have a moral ob-
ligation to recognize truth in history and counter attempts to disrespect the 
most sacred aspects of human rights – freedom, dignity, and life – which are 
implicated in the question of sexual enslavement. We write this article in an 
effort to remedy the injustice caused by Contracting for Sex in the Pacific 
War’s distortion of history, to the modest extent possible in our capacity as 
academics.

